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THE STRUGGLE FOR REASON: THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS

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In consequence of this primary mutual hostility of human beings, civilized society is perpetually threatened with disintegration. The interest of work in common would not hold it together; instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests.

—Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*

In any case, while his social face can be his most personal possession and the center of his security and pleasure, it is only on loan to him from society; it will be withdrawn unless he conducts himself in a way that is worthy of it.... One's face, then, is a sacred thing, and the expressive order required to sustain it is therefore a ritual one.

—Erving Goffman, *Interaction Ritual*

Managers stress the need to exercise iron self-control and to have the ability to mask all emotion and intention behind bland, smiling, and agreeable public faces. They believe it is a fatal weakness to lose control of oneself, in any way, in a public forum.

—Robert Jackall, "Moral Mazes"

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INTRODUCTION

Sociologists of emotion have argued that the psychologists get it wrong by not situating emotional responses in *context*. By arguing that emotional processes are primarily intrapsychic and thus culturally universal, psychologists miss "the biography of an age, a culture, and a location in a social structure, whether of social class, gender, ethnicity, occupation, or other social differentia" (Kemper 1991, p. 302). At the same time, sociologists fall into their own trap: they argue that context is all important, yet regard all context as structurally similar. Thus, Kemper (1978) argues that general social structural dimensions give rise to felt emotions, and Hochschild (1983) argues that the social structure is moderated by various cultural norms called "feeling rules." How different are these approaches from the theorizing of cognitive appraisal theorists (e.g., Frijda 1986; Roseman 1984) who argue that dimensions of situational structure gives rise to specific emotions?

What is needed for more specificity in these theories is a middle range approach, a level above that of intrapsychic processing, but below that of society. I suggest that a fruitful context for studying emotion is at the level of organizations. Certainly this is not a new approach for sociologists in general or sociologists of emotion in particular. Collins (1975, p. 286) argues that "if there is one area of sociology where serious cumulative development has taken place, it is in organizations," and proposes that organizations are based on marketplaces of emotion (Collins 1981). The primary focus of these studies, however, is on how organizational examples can instruct us about society rather than what societal aspects can tell us about organizations. Though Hochschild (1983) in her pathbreaking study of airline flight attendants and bill collectors did focus on the organizational context, her ideas were focused on the implications of emotion control for the societal level, the overall "commercialization of human feeling." I am interested in the meaning of emotions and emotional control for organizations in particular.

The central argument of this paper is that because organizations are structured in certain ways, the feeling and display of emotions in organizations tend also to exhibit structure and patterns. To make this connection, I will first trace the theoretical heritage of emotions in organizations, to show that the taken-for-granted view is that work organizations, if rationally designed, exclude emotionality. I will then argue that rationally designed organizations, if anything, *produce* emotionality of a heightened sort. Drawing on the theories of Kemper (1978), Hochschild (1983), and the psychoevolutionary theory of Plutchik (1980, 1991), I propose a model of emotional response in the organizational context, showing how structural factors such as hierarchy and identity produce strong emotions, which are then modified and moderated by cultural norms for emotional expression (see Figure 1). The links in the model are presented as four propositions supported by literature drawing on




Figure 1. Structural Sources and Cultural Mediation of Emotional Response in Organizations

biological, sociological, and psychological theory. These propositions are explored through a study of emotional episodes in organizations. Finally, I conclude with implications for managers and researchers of such a model for studying emotions in organizations and the contributions it may hold for sociological theory.

Definitions and Research Questions

The fact that biological, sociological, and psychological literatures (not to mention anthropological, organizational, and others) provide insight here illustrates the complexity of emotion. A compelling and comprehensive definition of emotion has eluded researchers. There is, however, substantial agreement about two aspects. First, we can say with some confidence that as individuals we can identify when we are "emotional": we know when we are angry or sad or happy, though we may experience complex combinations of these. Second, there is general agreement that emotions are elicited from events which are perceived as meaningful to individuals (Frijda 1986, p. 4).

A majority of this paper will be concerned with how emotion is elicited from meaningful events or situations. Further definition is required, though, of the labeling of emotion. There is fair agreement on what we label "emotional," and typically it comprises one or more of three forms of data (Frijda 1986): behavioral (such as facial expressions or aggressive actions), physiological (such as high pulse rate, sweaty palms), and subjective (our experiential knowledge that we "feel happy"). I am concerned with all three of these aspects, and I will group the latter two under the definition of "felt" emotions, here defined as complex, intrapsychic states consisting of an interaction between cognitive appraisals, action impulses, and patterned somatic reactions (Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman 1980), particularly those triggered by some aspect of an organizational setting. Behavioral cues will be described as displayed or expressed emotions, defined in terms of "facial expressions, bodily gestures, tone of voice, and language" (Rafaeli and Sutton 1989, p. 4).

There are organizational literatures corresponding to both aspects, but surprisingly little understanding of how the two interact. On one hand, studies of *felt* emotion have focused on the psychodynamic experiences of emotions at the individual, interpersonal, or small group level, focusing particularly on job satisfaction, defined as "a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one's job or job experiences" (Locke 1976, p. 1297). This emotional state can be characterized as being: (1) intrapsychic; (2) retrospective, that is, past oriented; and (3) long term (as opposed to immediately felt), and thus most properly termed a sentiment, "the relatively enduring affective features of ongoing relationships" (Smith-Lovin 1989, p. vi). On the other hand, studies of *expressed* emotions generally do focus on present, rather than retrospective emotions (e.g., Hochschild 1983; Sutton and Rafaeli 1988), but

theorized sources of these expressions have been limited to cultural normative factors (Van Maanen and Kunda 1989), or the norms implicit in roles (Rafaeli and Sutton 1989), about how participants "ought" to feel. There has been little attention to factors which satisfaction studies have elaborated, such as situational and structural factors—for example, task characteristics, hierarchy—which may either underlie cultural norms (Hochschild 1983; Morris and Feldman 1996) or may directly affect emotions (Kemper 1981). Further, there has been very little exploration of the relationship between felt emotions and the expressions they drive (Waldron and Krone 1991).

My focus is different from previous ones in two ways: first, I emphasize a functional rather than an instrumental approach to emotions in organizations, and second, I emphasize present (online) emotional responses rather than after-the-fact generalized ones. Research on emotions in organizations has been predominantly instrumental in the sense that the emphasis has been placed on identifying variables which shape emotions in ways most desirable to the organization (Mumby and Putnam 1992). Satisfaction research, for example, has received attention because it is presumed that increased satisfaction will lead to increased productivity (though this relationship has been shown not to be a causal one; in fact, it may be the other way around; Brayfield and Crockett 1955; Lawler and Porter 1967). Research on expressed emotion has emphasized how emotional displays can help both individuals and the organization gain control over customers, and thus enhance financial outcomes (Rafaeli and Sutton 1989). I am interested in the implications of emotions *themselves* for organizations, in essence a functional, rather than an instrumental approach. Specifically, what functions do particular emotions serve, for both individuals and organizations? What do they mean for the process of organizing?

The second difference is that I emphasize individual affective responses to the organizational situation, but unlike satisfaction studies, I focus on how individuals feel while *doing* their work rather than the feelings individuals have *about* their work in general. As in expressed emotion research and phenomenological approaches (e.g., de Rivera 1984), I am interested in emotional responses and expressions online: the joy, pride, fear, and shame of ongoing work in organizations. Moreover, my emphasis is on the interaction of organizations and these individually felt emotions. My guiding research question is, "How do organization structural and cultural factors interact to shape individuals' online emotions—both felt and displayed?" What emotions tend to be felt and expressed in organizations? Which are not?

In making the distinction between social structure and culture, I follow Blau (1960, p. 178), who argues that cultural factors represent "the common values and norms embodied in a culture or sub-culture," while structure represents the "network of social relations in which processes of social interaction become organized and through which social positions of individuals and subgroups

become differentiated" (cf. Gordon 1990). In this case, however, I am speaking specifically of *organizational* structures and cultures; thus, structure in organizations includes how individuals are related to one another, both formally and informally, how tasks are designed, and how tenure is determined: thus, structure includes both a framework for interaction and the process of interaction itself (Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood 1980, p. 2). Cultural norms are "basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organization" (Schein 1985, p. 6), especially those assumptions and the norms they produce relating to how members should feel.

The following section outlines a brief history of the study of emotion in organizations, followed by an assessment of current organizational studies. This review supports an argument that structure is largely missing as a variable in these studies, and that by exploring the effect of organizational structural components (such as hierarchy and identity groups) on emotions we paint a more complete picture of the influence of organizations on emotion and of emotion on organizations.

A SHORT HISTORY OF EMOTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONS

While Durkheim (1915, p. 475) argued, at the societal level, that the emotional energy generated by groups was essential to sustaining collectivities (and thus society), and Freud argued, at the individual level, that repressed passions welling up from the unconscious explained much "irrational" behavior, organization theorists have generally argued, at a level somewhere between, that emotions were not of central concern. Rather, organizations, properly designed, could inhibit and control the impact of individual emotions. Theorists followed neither Durkheim nor Freud, but Weber (1946, p. 216), who argued that the bureaucratic ideal was one in which "love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements" were removed from the process. From the earliest theorizing organizations were the metaphorical mind of a mind/body duality: they were conceived as cognitive-rational entities which could structure events, people, and situations so that individuals' irrational emotions would not infringe on goal-directed decision making (Simon 1976). One story of organization theory, then, is the conflict between a dominant rational model and its challengers—models which point to the substantial limits on organizational rationality (Simon 1976), the gulf separating rational assumptions from empirical reality (Dalton 1959), and the importance of affect in shaping structures which attempt to be rational (Homans 1950; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1947). I will outline both sides of this conflict.

The Rational Model

In the view of the classical rational model which management theorists relied on, individuals optimally make decisions by referring to known goals and objectives, calculating values to various known alternatives, and consistently choosing alternatives whose consequences rank highest in the decision maker's payoff function (Allison 1971). The rational model writ large to organizations proposed that the collectivity should behave in much the same way as this rational individual would, a proposal best exemplified by Frederick W. Taylor, who found the rationality of machines perfectly compatible with his proposed organizational designs: "In the past the man [sic] has been first; in the future the system must be first," he argued (1911, p. 7). The problem, then, was to devise the proper *system* into which could be placed the appropriate parts, human and otherwise. The implication of this metaphor was that the parts had to be interchangeable; the needs and values of humans were assumed to be stable while the system could advance.

While Taylor applied the rational model to lower levels of the organization and minute actions by workers, arguing that this influence would spread upward, other classical theorists applied the model to top levels and assumed it would spread downward (Scott 1987). Fayol (1949) and others argued that rational principles could be consistently applied to the managerial function and—with some flexibility—enhance the practice of organization regardless of environment. Principles such as specialization of tasks among groups, the importance of a hierarchy of authority, limited spans of control, and the controlling of tasks around purpose, process, clientele, or place were central concerns (Simon 1976, p. 21). The emphasis, overall, was on formalization. By regulating management through understood principles, managers could gain control over their unwieldy collectivities.

Writing at the same time as Taylor, though a culture and distance away, Weber (1946) agreed that a rational structure would inexorably rationalize the behavior of human beings. However, Weber was less interested in the prescriptions of the classical management school, providing instead an extended description of the increasing rationalization of society, of which bureaucracy was a central tenet. Weber's analysis can be seen as a zero-sum game describing the rise of rationality at the expense of emotionality. Where traditional and charismatic structures failed, he argued, was that the emotional ties they implied between leaders and workers reduced rational accomplishment of goals. Charismatic relationships, whose legitimacy arose from the emotional bond, a "devotion born of distress and enthusiasm," were specifically characterized by an absence of rationality (1946, p. 249). Ideal-type bureaucracy, however, with its fixed jurisdictional areas, hierarchy of offices, sets of general rules governing performance, selection of personnel on purely technical bases, and so on was to him "the very embodiment of rationality" (Gerth and Mills 1946, p. 49). But

to guarantee their technical superiority, bureaucracies were, by nature, formal and impersonal. They were "*Sine ira et studio*," without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm," and successful only to the extent that they eliminated "all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation" (1946, p. 216).

Unlike Taylor and the classical management theorists, however, Weber was not enamored of bureaucracy's effects on its human inhabitants, noting the tendency for the individual to become a "cog in an ever-moving mechanism" (p. 228). In fact, he associated gains in secular rationality with an iron cage of mechanism, depersonalization, and oppressive routine. He saw history as the illustration of the inevitable trend toward rationalization; in the end, the technological structure would dominate the individual.

Simon (1945 [1976]) was much less sure that organizational structure could overcome the irrationality of individuals. He altered the direct application of rational models to organizations forever by arguing that since the assumptions economists made about individuals were preposterous, the extrapolations to organizations were similarly preposterous. Individuals in organizations, properly conceived, did not act as rational economizers, but in fact as administrators, responding to the social psychological problems of cooperation, and in the process invalidating the rational model's assumptions. While rationality requires complete knowledge of consequences, Simon argued, knowledge of consequences is always fragmentary. Since consequences lie in the future, "imagination must supply the lack of experienced feeling in attaching value to them," and thus values could be only imperfectly anticipated (1945 [1976], p. 81). Finally, rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors, while in actual decision making only a very few of all possible alternatives ever come to mind.

Rationality in organizations is, in short, bounded. This did not, however, mean that behavior in organizations is irrational. Rather, organizations are *intendedly* rational: by applying structure to the individual's environment they provide *value premises* to guide decisions and limit the myriad alternatives which would rationally confront individual decision makers. Simon, then, argued for a middle ground between the exaggerated rationality assumptions of economists and the exaggerated irrationality assumptions fostered by Freud. Individuals might be limited in their capacity to act rationally, but they intended to do so, and constructed their organizations to enhance that intention.

The Response to the Rational Model

Though Simon emphasized the limits of rationality, he was optimistic that organizations, properly structured, could enhance human aspirations to rationality. The Hawthorne studies, undertaken in a plant of the Western Electric Company during the 1920s and 1930s some 10 years before his work,

had questioned the impact of organizational structure. In studying the effects of lighting intensity on productivity and observing group interaction in test rooms, the Harvard researchers made a startling discovery: regardless of how the organizational "machine" was structured, the relationships of its human parts made a good deal of difference. This now cliché discovery ushered in 50 years of research on the interaction of individuals and the organization, known as the human relations movement within organizational behavior.

The Hawthorne studies (and their descendants) held four primary implications for the study of emotions in organizations. First, the studies emphasized the importance of nonrational "sentiments" in guiding much of individual and group behavior in organizations (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1947). Sentiments were very broadly defined, including such elements as "affection, affective content of sympathy and indulgence, intimate sympathy, respect, pride, antagonism, affective history, scorn, and sentimental nostalgia," even "hunger and thirst" (Homans 1950, p. 37). Individuals, the researchers discovered, did not behave as the "rational" actors the machine model assumed, primarily motivated by economic gain. Rather, workers were motivated by a variety of values quite outside the formal structure, unspoken values which held, for example, that employees wanted to belong to a company that was said to be a good place to work, and thus brought them pride (Homans 1950, p. 95).

Implicit in this conception of sentiments, however, was that these feelings were "nonrational" and therefore at odds with the presumed rational goals of the company (Perrow 1986). Sentiments were seen as the source of behaviors by workers to entertain themselves during dull tasks, to enforce group norms at the expense of individual freedom, and ultimately, to limit production to an acceptable level (Roy 1960). However, as Perrow (1986) points out, from the workers' standpoint such behavior was hardly irrational: by limiting production the workers hoped to prevent the layoffs that were occurring at the time of the Hawthorne studies. From the outset, then, emotional concerns were linked with goals contrary to the organization.

A second implication of the Hawthorne studies was to emphasize that employees have important emotional "needs" that should be met to secure performance. By analogizing to an organismic model, the researchers assumed that humans—as complex organisms—have certain functional needs necessary for their survival (Morgan 1986). The question then became how to fill those needs and thus produce a more fulfilled, productive human being, a question given structure and science with the publication of Maslow's hierarchy (1970). Once the "lower order" needs of safe working conditions and health plans were satisfied, observers emphasized that organizations must seek to fulfill "higher order" needs, such as autonomy, achievement, and commitment. This dichotomy, developed by Herzberg (1966) as two-factor theory, led to a new emphasis on providing for needs beyond merely hygienic ones. Organizations were to recognize that "the intellectual potentialities of the average human

being are only partially utilized" in corporations (McGregor 1960, p. 48) and provide for "participative management" (Likert 1961) and other schemes which took advantage of those potentials.

A third implication was that the behavior of workers was seen as essentially *social*: rather than working as autonomous contract players, individuals were seen as intimately affected by group norms and values (Homans 1950; Scott 1987). Homans in particular argued that groups were of primary importance in fulfilling emotional needs. In a sense, the assumptions of a psychological model were generalized to larger units. Groups were seen as having "needs," having "personalities," and providing the creative energy for productivity. Groups, too, were seen as fruitful proving grounds for training new leaders: The resulting T-group movement emphasized the importance of emotional openness, authenticity in interpersonal relations, and collaborative, rather than hierarchical, behavior (Tannenbaum, Weschler, and Massarik 1961).

Finally, the Hawthorne studies implied the importance of individual differences in organizational behavior. Formal organizational structure did not matter as much as attributes of the individual, such as race, gender, and most importantly disposition or personality. The emphasis on disposition was most apparent in the plethora of organizational leadership studies that followed, seeking dimensions of which characteristics produced good leadership (e.g., Bowers and Seashore 1966; Stogdill and Coons 1957). Emotional considerations were explicit in the dimensions that emerged from the classic Ohio State University leadership studies begun in 1945. "Initiating structure" concerned structuring and defining the roles and tasks of both leader and subordinate; the second, "consideration," meant a concern for subordinates' feelings, respect for their ideas, and mutual trust (Perrow 1986). While emotionality was depicted as not specifically part of the exemplary leader's own style, recognition and empathy for others' emotions was.

The Hawthorne studies thus produced a spectrum of emotional concerns, from the mere fact that there *are* emotional considerations in organizations, to the impact of groups, to the idea that individuals act out emotions differently. The approaches tended to view various elements of emotion in different semantic terms (e.g., "satisfaction," "authenticity," "sentiments," "consideration"), however, with little emphasis on noting the coherent underlying theme: the human emotional reaction to organizations. For example, individual differences were stressed while downplaying the potential universality of emotional behavior and control. Too, as Perrow (1986) has amply pointed out, the Hawthorne studies and their interpretation by Roethlisberger and Dickson (1947), Mayo (1945), Homans (1950), and others have been critiqued extensively on ideological grounds. Specifically, the Hawthorne-inspired appreciation for human emotions did not preclude managerial control. The underlying emphasis of Mayo and others was how management could more effectively design itself to master the employee emotions so that productivity could be maximized.

RECENT STUDIES

Recent studies of emotion in organizations have approached the topic from all three sides of social action, examining structural, cultural, and dispositional impacts. I will outline the research on cultural norms, resulting from Hochschild's (1983) pathbreaking study, as well as the continuing interest (born of the Hawthorne studies) in individual dispositional impacts. I will then consider the influence of social structure.

Culture Norms Studies

Hochschild's (1983) study caused a renewed interest in the impact of organizations on emotions, and particularly, on emotional expression. Hochschild's work was important on two counts: first, it accentuated an interpretation of cultural norms as implying emotional control, and second, it emphasized the importance of emotional display by employees as an important organizational component. Hochschild argued that individuals delivering organizational services (such as flight attendants and bill collectors) must engage in *emotional labor*, that is they must manage feeling "to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display" (1983, p. 7). This labor is shaped by *feeling rules* which specify the range, intensity, duration, and object of emotions that should be experienced. Later studies differentiated feeling rules from *display rules*, which are expectations about which emotions ought to be expressed or hidden, the emphasis being on behavior rather than experience (Ekman 1985; Rafaeli and Sutton 1989). Hochschild argued that discrepancies between what individuals actually feel and are called on to display (the extent of their emotional labor), would lead to estrangement or alienation in workers. By engaging in extensive surface and deep acting, workers might lose their capacity to feel authentically. Hochschild emphasizes cultural norms in that these drive the feeling rules which shape emotional display. These norms, external to the worker, direct the worker in their management of emotion.

Though Hochschild's study has prompted much interest, there is as yet little evidence to support her contention that discrepancies between felt and expressed emotions result in estrangement or alienation in workers (Morris and Feldman 1996). Parkinson (1991) in a study of hairdressers found, on the one hand, that respondents who reported that their interaction style involved deceiving clients about their private feelings also tended to show worse psychological adjustment and reported feeling less satisfied with their jobs. On the other hand, the results provided "little support for Hochschild's (1983) argument that emotional identification with the work-role leads to psychological maladjustment" (1991, p. 431). That is, those who most identified with the required codes of expression management were likely to be *most* satisfied. Though there are clear differences in context between airline

attendants and hairdressers, this study suggests that indeed, continued deception is psychologically harmful, but "deep acting" especially when done in good faith (Rafaeli and Sutton 1989) may not be. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) argued similarly that increased identification with a role would weaken the negative effects on well-being of emotional labor, and strengthen positive effects. Wharton (1993) found that workers employed in emotional labor-intensive jobs were no more likely to experience emotional exhaustion than those not in such jobs, and were somewhat *more* likely to be satisfied, in contrast to Hochschild's suggestions.

Hochschild's work thus raised the critical distinction between felt and expressed emotion, and the fact that there may be no simple match between the two. In an early conceptual framework applying Hochschild's emphasis on expressed emotion as part of the work role, Rafaeli and Sutton (1987) suggested that shaping norms for emotional expression can produce both organizational and individual outcomes. Organizations will gain by establishing emotions pleasing to customers and thus appropriate to the sales transaction; individuals will gain financially if they express the required emotions, though they might suffer, too, from the stress of emotional dissonance (Hochschild 1983). For instance, organizations can set emotional norms by selecting individuals who fit the proper pattern (e.g., "All Americans" for McDonald's), socializing them to the proper emotional expressions to put on (e.g., extensive theatrical training at Disneyland) and punishing those who fail to perform the role properly (e.g., sad flight attendants and happy funeral directors).

A quantitative study of convenience stores (Sutton and Rafaeli 1988) was undertaken to test whether an organizational outcome (revenues) could be linked to expressed emotion, hypothesizing that stores which displayed organizationally desired emotions (in this case, positive expressions to customers) would be associated with higher revenues. The study produced more complex results than this simple association: higher revenues were associated with busier stores, and busier stores were associated with *less* positive emotional expression; thus the hypothesized equation was reversed: "store pace [was] a cause, rather than an effect, of expressive behavior" (1988, p. 474). In this case, the organization's norm of expressing positive emotions was not strong enough to overcome the structure of the situation and the actual feelings aroused in employees. Employees displayed what they were feeling.

Sutton (1991), however, showed the importance of setting by finding substantial evidence of effective organizational emotion norms in a bill collection agency. While in convenience stores expressed emotions were less important to either employee or customer in carrying out transactions, the bill collecting organization Sutton studied "successfully induced members to comply with espoused norms about expressed emotions" through the predicted means of selection, socialization, and rewards. Sutton's study has two important themes. First, Sutton emphasized the preeminence of cultural norms

and the fact that they are explicitly managed. He found that managers in the collection company put forth more effort to maintain norms that clashed with collectors' inner feelings about debtors than to maintain norms that were congruent with collectors' inner feelings. For instance, norms to express neutrality to angry debtors had to be enforced more stringently than norms to be easy-going (at first) with distressed debtors. Thus, an understanding of employee felt emotions by managers was a requirement. The second theme was that emotional expression is a form of social influence, at two levels. He implies that though organizations essentially control employees' emotional expression to gain outcomes, there is a second stage in the process. Through emotion management employees, in turn, gain control over customers: by expressing a sense of urgency, anger, or disgust, collectors are able to exert power over debtors (1991, p. 245). Emotion control, then, is not merely indicative of the organization's power over the individual; it is also an instrumental form of personal power at the individual level.

Leidner (1993) in her study of workers at McDonald's and insurance agents, echoes the theme of emotion as critical to the power struggle between service providers and recipients. "Almost inevitably," Leidner notes, "their jobs require them to take an instrumental approach to their own identity and to relations with others." Like Hochschild, however, Leidner is concerned that while a routinization of human interaction is critical to the smooth interchange in service interaction, this routinization simultaneously calls into question issues of authenticity, individuality, and personal integrity (1993, p. 8). The benefit of routines are that they provide scripts and rules for effectively dealing with a variety of sometimes recalcitrant service recipients. The cost is that the script may not fit providers' beliefs about themselves, and cause them to question their emotional manipulation of customers. Can they use the script, effective as it is in ensuring customer compliance, and not think of themselves as manipulative? Such feelings, Leidner argues, heightens the discrepancy between workers' self-identities and the identities they are called on to enact at work.

Though Rafaeli and Sutton are basically optimistic about the potential for emotional control to serve both organizational and individual outcomes, Van Maanen and Kunda (1989) are much less sanguine. They first argue that organizations have unwritten rules about what emotional expressions are valued and which are anathema and that these are intricately intertwined with the pervading organizational culture. But further, those organizations which have a pronounced concern for managing a "strong" culture (such as the firms the authors studied, Disneyland and an unnamed high technology concern) "...are precisely those organizations where member adherence to a set of feeling rules is considered by management crucial to the success of the enterprise" (1989, p. 46). Cultures are strong to the degree that participants know their organization's goals, values, and norms, and further, are *aligned* with them; they have taken the organization's attributes as their own (Deal

and Kennedy 1982; Kotter and Heskett 1992). Strong culture organizations tend to exhibit a codified set of management beliefs and practices which are exemplified through myths, heroes, and symbols, and are believed to be unique among other, similar firms (Peters and Waterman 1982; Martin, Feldman, Hatch, and Sitkin 1983). Van Maanen and Kunda argue that the stronger the culture, the more the feeling rules; the two are inseparable. Further, this combination has a sinister effect: organizations have sought to control the individual's body through technology, the mind through bureaucracy and hierarchy, and now the emotion through culture. Developing cultural attributes is the way organizations overcome the negative and deadening effects of technical and bureaucratic controls. Culture, in this view, is consciously managed, and aimed at the heart.

A limitation to the current research on emotional labor has been the tendency for researchers to focus on the relatively clear expressed emotion norms present in boundary-spanning occupations, particularly participants in service roles (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993; Hochschild 1983a; Leidner 1993; Sutton 1991; Wharton 1993). While these sites are interesting because they are extreme, this paper argues for recognizing the inherency of emotion to all aspects of organizational life, within managerial ranks, in work teams, at machines. While norms for emotional feeling and expression may be more explicit for customer service roles, emotions are felt and norms proffered throughout organizations; in fact, as Parsons (1951) accentuated as the demeanor of the professional, the typical norm may be for neither positive nor negative expressed emotions, but for emotional neutrality. Studies of employees in stressful organizational tasks, such as doctors in medical school (Smith and Kleinman 1989) and police detectives (Steinross and Kleinman 1989) have shown that individuals may be socialized to express little emotion rather than either extreme. In the majority of organizational settings, strong emotional expressions may be entirely absent, hidden behind a mask of "agreeable" positivity (Jackall 1983).

Individual Differences Studies

Though the bulk of recent interest in emotions in organizations has been focused on cultural normative factors, a small but continuing literature has emphasized a dispositional or individual differences approach. Contrary to cultural norms studies, which emphasize the arousal and control of emotions in response to particular situations, researchers taking this approach argue that relatively enduring characteristics of individuals may be more important in determining emotional behavior than situational stimuli. I will outline here two areas that connect emotional expression and individual differences in the organizational literature: dispositional and gender approaches, and how they might be improved by an appreciation of structure.

Dispositional affect or affectivity refers to a general tendency to react to situations and events, such as jobs or people, with particular moods, such as to be generally happy or sad (Lazarus 1991; Staw and Barsade 1993). The dispositional approach has received some recent empirical confirmation. Using data from a 50-year longitudinal study of individual attitude change, Staw, Bell, and Clawson (1986) showed first that individuals' affective disposition was consistent over time, and second, that these dispositional characteristics (e.g., tendency to be "likable" or "warm" or "hostile") could significantly predict job attitudes (1986, p. 71). Staw and colleagues argued that regardless of how individuals develop their disposition, whether through social learning or heredity, these consistent attributes shape perceptions of one's work. Staw, Sutton, and Pelled (1994) extended this argument by arguing that dispositional positive emotions—both expressed and felt—are associated with positive outcomes in organizations, outcomes including higher work achievement, greater job enrichment, and a more supportive social context. Staw and Barsade (1993) found overall, positive affect facilitated, rather than inhibited decision making, interpersonal performance, and ratings of managerial potential. Further study has shown links between positive and negative affect and helping behavior, biases in information processing, and evaluations of others (Alloy and Abramson 1988; Cardy and Dobbins 1986; George and Brief 1992).

Research has shown differences between men and women in their expression of particular emotions. Women tend to be more expressive emotionally than men (Deaux 1985) and are particularly more likely to express warmth and liking during interactions with others (Bem 1974; Birnbaum, Nosanchuck, and Croll 1980). This finding has been applied in the organizational context; Rafaeli (1989) found in her study of clerk and customer transactions that female clerks were more likely than male clerks to smile at both male and female customers. While women are more likely to express positive emotions, they may be less likely to express negative ones, and particularly anger. The assertion literature suggests that women have a harder time expressing negative (anger or disagreement) as opposed to positive (e.g., liking or approval) assertions (Blier and Blier-Wilson 1989), though the application of this hypothesis has been mixed. Davis, LaRosa, and Foshee (1992) found that female subjects judged an angry episode between a supervisor and subordinate as having greater costs to the relationship and greater personal costs to themselves than did male subjects. On the other hand, Allen and Haccoun (1976) found that females exceeded males in reported emotionality, and were more likely to express fear and sadness than males, but did not differ in terms of their likelihood of expressing anger. Tavis (1989) concurs with these findings. These studies suggest that in examining gender differences it is not sufficient to divide emotions into positive and negative, but particular emotions should be delineated and further explored, such as joy, sadness, fear, and anger.

Consistent with approaches emphasizing women's capacity for managing positive emotions, Hochschild (1983) argued that women are expected to engage in more emotion management than men both at work and in private life, and to find themselves more typically in work roles like flight attendants (managing positive emotions) rather than bill collectors (managing negative ones). She linked the need to manage emotion to women's lesser access to power, authority, and status in society, and thus their presence in work requiring emotion labor. Little research has tested this contention; Wharton (1993) found that though women were more likely to be in roles requiring emotion labor, they did not suffer significantly more from emotional exhaustion.

Numerous other individual differences have been studied at the intersection of organizations and emotional expression, including self-monitoring ability (Snyder 1987), Machiavellianism (Christie and Geis 1970), and social trait anxiety (Gardner and Martinko 1988). What is underappreciated, however, is the critical interaction of these individual differences and the organizational context. As Shields (1987, p. 232) points out in the case of sex differences, by asking "Who's more emotional—men or women?" we imply that psychologically relevant phenomena should be seen solely as characterizing the individual, rather than as "functions of the circumstances in which the individual is behaving." Individual differences in emotion must be seen in the context of the constraining nature of organizational structure and culture, a theme to be developed next.

Structure: The Missing Link

From the preceding studies we can conceive of emotional response in organizations as an interaction between individual disposition and situations, which have been conceived primarily in terms of cultural factors. There is growing emotion research, but the sheer amount should not be construed as indicating a coherent picture of emotion in organizations. For one thing, the definition of emotion shifts substantially. Disposition studies have focused on measures of long-term affective satisfaction, while recent studies of cultural effects have focused on observations of ongoing displayed emotions (Sutton and Rafaeli 1988). What is missing is an understanding of the effect of structure—such as levels of hierarchy, levels of task autonomy, presence of teams, and so on—on felt emotion and the displayed emotions that may result.

Though Sutton and Rafaeli's research stream acknowledges such structural components as recruitment and selection, socialization, and rewards and punishments, the purpose of these components is seen as helping to establish organizational norms—there is little consideration of their possible direct emotional effects. Yet Sutton and Rafaeli (1988) are skeptical of the power of culture in actually shaping emotional expression. They conclude that store pace, inner feelings, and "local norms" were more important than corporate

culture norms in determining actual emotional display in their convenience store study. They later (1990, p. 625) state that, "regardless of display rules, service employees' inner feelings often strongly influenced their expressed emotions," and Sutton argued that normative displays may be simply "managerial justifications for behavior" that are superseded by employees' true feelings and emotional behaviors best suited to "getting their jobs done" (quoted in Mumby and Putnam 1992, p. 479). Thus, one outcome of Rafaeli and Sutton's studies is that in most cases, expressed emotions can be understood as proxies for felt emotions; the two may be more congruent than theorists emphasizing emotion management (such as Hochschild) have proposed. But if culture is of lesser or unknown importance in explaining either felt or displayed emotions, what could provide a fuller explanation? And if expressed emotions are best understood as proxies for felt emotions, what are the sources of felt emotions in the first place?

One clue, based on the approaches of Kemper and Hochschild, is the underlying structure of the organizational situation. As I argue in outlining the model below, what is missing in Kemper's model is an appreciation of culture, what is missing in Hochschild's model is an appreciation of structure, and what is missing in both is a link between felt and expressed emotions. Kemper (1981, p. 344) argues that felt and expressed emotion are essentially the same thing. Hochschild argues that at the structural intersection of workers and customers, discrepancies are likely to arise between felt and expressed emotions, but the link between this discrepancy and organizational outcomes such as satisfaction or stress has yet to be established (Morris and Feldman 1996). In order to understand expressed emotion, we must look first at the felt emotions that give rise to them, as well as the structural and situational attributes that bring them about. Further, we need to examine structures and situations characterizing the whole organization, rather than merely boundary-spanning roles, typically service-oriented ones. Thus, we must view felt emotions not merely as a dependent variable of structural cues, but as a mediating variable between structure and culture, and as an independent variable ultimately shaping structure (cf. Thoits 1989).

Why Organizations?

We also must ask how the study of organizations in particular aids our study of the sociology of emotions. Organizations are particularly appropriate sites for the study of emotion because they are microcosms of society. That is, the structural components that exist in society to control emotions exist in organizations, and, I would argue, are more salient. Elias (1939 [1982]) argues, for instance, that control of emotion is inherent to civilization itself. Through an historical analysis of etiquette in the royal court society of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Elias contended that the "civilizing process," whereby self-

control is substituted for acts of physical violence—driven by extreme passions—came about for three reasons. First, there was an increasing monopolization of power in the hands of a few, which created a tendency for the power-holders to limit the emotional impulses of those regulated. This is made easier because the individual tends to internalize these regulations (akin to Freud's superego) to the point where one's personality structure "corresponds to the controlling agency forming itself in society at large" (p. 240). In order to fit the new regulation, individuals exert self-control, a constant pressure to inhibit affective outbursts.

Second, the economic trend toward division of labor increases interdependence, and thus makes individuals more aware of their emotional conduct. Expressed emotions have effects on others, and these must be recognized as interdependence increases. Finally, the civilizing process takes place "wherever functions are established that demand constant hindsight and foresight in interpreting the actions and intentions of others" (Elias 1939 [1982], p. 247)—as the tempo of life increases, we increase both our planning of the future and our explaining of the past. We no longer react spontaneously to stimuli, but plan our reactions in advance. We are continuously self-aware (cf. Hochschild 1979, p. 563).

I propose that in organizations, these structural components and others take on a salience different from other social worlds. Monopolization of power is inherent in traditional organizational hierarchical structure; interdependence is inherent in interactions with internal departments and groups, and advance planning is emphasized as essential to organizational survival—strategic plans abound. Organizations, in essence, make salient the basic structure of social roles. As Hamilton and Sanders (1992, p. 8) argue, social relationships can be thought of in terms of two fundamental dimensions: vertical and horizontal ties to others. The sources of these dimensions, which they term hierarchy and solidarity, respectively, are clearly traceable to Weber (in terms of hierarchy) and Durkheim (in terms of solidarity and collectivity). They are further captured in Elias's terms of monopolization of power and interdependence (and, not coincidentally, in Kemper's terms of power and status accord). Organizations make salient the vertical by instituting hierarchical structures, where one's very survival in the organization is dependent on acceptance of legitimized authority (Weber 1946), and make salient the horizontal by emphasizing work teams, peer relationships, and interorganizational ties. Below I explore the specific emotional outcomes of these structural characteristics.

Overall, I view organizations as settings of strong emotions because elements of social structure are in the foreground. The organizational hierarchy is contrived by individuals, the peer relationships constructed by fiat. This means that structure is open to some negotiation, but at the same time, it means that resulting practices and procedures must be consciously legitimized, and the emotional part played in the process de-emphasized. It is my argument that

this very contrivance contributes to strong emotions, which are then denied and obscured by organizational norms for emotional expression. The taken-for-granted notion is that organizations, if rationally designed, exclude emotionality. As I will show below, it doesn't. Rational organization, if anything, *produces* emotionality of a heightened sort. At the same time, it paradoxically structures itself to portray emotionality as aberration and neutrality as the norm.

A MODEL OF EMOTIONAL RESPONSE IN ORGANIZATIONS

The model presented as Figure 1 is an attempt to show the centrality of emotion in organizational processes and codify the preceding literature review by linking organizational structure and emotional responses. In it I argue that felt emotions which arise from structural cues are mediated by cultural norms for emotional expression. I summarize themes suggested by the literature as four propositions, illustrated by Figure 1 (Note: the numbers in the model are linkages, rather than tied to specific propositions). An exploratory study is then outlined, and organizational implications of the model are discussed.

Organizations as Emotional Entities

An emphasis on organizations as sites of strongly felt emotions runs counter to the dominant frame of reference used in explaining organizational behavior, which is primarily cognitive (Ashforth and Humphrey 1995; Pfeffer 1982). Historically, in both psychology and sociology, cognitive processes have been much further elaborated than emotional ones (Lazarus, Kanner, and Folkman 1980; Schott 1979) and this is reflected in organizational research; theorists such as Weick (1979) have gone so far as to define organizations as cognitive entities. Cognitive organization theorists have argued, for instance, that due to individuals' boundedly rational character, much of organization activity can be characterized as habitual, or the explication of organizational schemas or maps (Gioia and Poole 1984; Goodman 1968; Weick 1979). Analysts who emphasize emotional processes raise two questions about the emphasis on cognitive maps, however: first, if so much of organization life is driven by schemas, how much cognition is actually going on? And second, how can the obvious psychological influence of emotions on cognition (Zajonc 1980), and thus on organizational systems, be ignored (cf. Barnard 1938)? Sociologists of emotion, such as Collins (1981, p. 994), agree generally with the cognitive schema approach that "complex contingencies cannot be calculated rationally, and hence... actors must rely largely on tacit assumptions and organizational routine." However, Collins (p. 994) argues that the implicit negotiation over assumptions and routine are not cognitive, but emotional:

The solution must be that negotiations are carried out implicitly, on a different level than the use of consciously manipulated verbal symbols. I propose that the mechanism is *emotional* rather than cognitive. Individuals monitor others' attitudes toward social coalitions, and hence toward the degree of support for routines, by feeling the amount of confidence and enthusiasm there is toward certain leaders and activities, or the amount of fear of being attacked by a strong coalition, or the amount of contempt for a weak one.

Organizations, then, are best conceived as marketplaces of emotional and cultural resources, where resources are compared through conversational rituals and loyalties and power are negotiated. Thus, an important part of organizational life is the degree to which participants monitor what each is feeling toward the other and especially toward those in authority (Collins 1981, p. 994). In this conception, emotional rather than cognitive negotiations of organizational meaning are predominant, and have been indicated, but not highlighted, in such organizational research targets as group dynamics, individual motivation, the emotional characteristics of leaders, and job satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Our dominant models for examining key organizational processes are cognitive (i.e., decision making, learning, expectancy theories of motivation), yet emotions permeate organizational life. Hence,

Proposition 1. Organizations should be conceptualized as emotional as well as cognitive entities.

The Psychoevolutionary Basis of Emotions

If emotions are central to understanding organization processes, and elements of social structure, as I have argued, are in the organizational foreground, what structural characteristics have potential emotional outcomes? One answer to this question draws on the underlying basis of emotional response, noting that emotions may be seen as adaptive responses to evolutionary requirements. Plutchik (1980, p. 130) offers a functional psychoevolutionary synthesis which argues that organisms at all developmental levels face certain common survival problems, including "finding food, avoiding predators, and locating mates." Emotions serve as behavioral patterns which help organisms adapt to these problems by providing internal preparations for action as well as external behavior appropriate to controlling the environment. Thus, anger successfully prepares the body by increasing the heart rate and heightening attentiveness, and seeks to control environmental forces through facial expression (e.g., snarling, hair raised) and actions (aggressive approach) designed to elicit fear in others.

By identifying these basic life problems we can also identify the essential emotional patterns attached to them. Plutchik identifies four existential crises which all organisms face, which in turn produce eight basic emotions: (1)

hierarchy, concerning the vertical dimension of dominance and subdominance, is predicted to arouse anger in those high in a hierarchy, and fear in those at lower levels; (2) *territoriality*, concerning the boundaries which organisms are driven to construct, leading to emotions of anticipation in exploring one's territory, and surprise, when boundaries are penetrated; (3) *identity*, referring to the basic question of who we are and what group we belong to, producing opposed emotions of acceptance (taking in, incorporating), and rejection (expelling); and finally, (4) *temporality*, referring to the fact of the limited duration of an organism's life, leading to emotions of sadness evoked at loss of life, and joy in the experience of birth and procreation. Combining various forms of these eight basic emotions, Plutchik argues, produces all other emotion types.

Plutchik thus provides not only elements of a deep structure underlying the evolutionary process, but further, the emotional implications of this structure. Central to the model presented here is the notion that these structural cues can be adapted to higher levels, from the relational to the organizational. An example of two of Plutchik's dimensions (hierarchy and identity) at the social relationship level is Kemper's (1991) emphasis on stratified societal roles as generating emotions. Kemper discounted norms as essential to the production of emotions, arguing rather that emotions are aroused *directly* by structural components, not essentially mediated by culture. Through extensive factor analytic descriptions of social interaction, Kemper (1978, p. 28) proposed that social relationships could be adequately represented as two orthogonal dimensions generalized by the question

"Why does A do what B wants him [or her] to do?" Either A does what B wants because A is actually or potentially being coerced to do so by B, or A does what B wants because A wants to do it as a benefit to B.

The former he termed *power*, which indicates behaviors oriented toward dominance, coercion, threat, or punishment; the latter he termed *status accord* (in the sense of giving status to another) which indicates behaviors understood as supportive, giving, friendly, congenial, and rewarding. Social relations consist of different mixes of power and status-accord behaviors, and when these relations are fairly stable over time, they are considered to be social structure. Thus, for example, power becomes structured through patterns of organizational hierarchy; status becomes structured as the ongoing peer relationships. Kemper (1990, p. 221) emphasizes that emotions generally result from outcomes of social interaction, and it thus follows that effects of the two orthogonal dimensions lead us to emotional outcomes. For instance, "Increase in status obtained from the other will lead to *satisfaction* or *happiness*, while decrease in status will lead to *anger* or *shame*, and/or *depression*" (1990, p. 222, emphasis in original).

Further, structural cues at the biological and social levels can be seen as having correlates in the organizational context. Hierarchy is accentuated through discrete levels of authority; identity is an outcome of informal relationships as well as consciously constructed work teams and strong cultures (Ouchi 1980; Peters and Waterman 1982); territory is codified in organizational departments and spatial arrangements (Pfeffer 1982, p. 260; Scott 1987, p. 34); and temporality is dealt with through employment contracts and termination and tenure policies. Therefore, I propose that organization structure reflects, in constricted, contrived form, basic evolutionary structures:

Proposition 2. Organizational structural cues may be conceptualized as deriving from and responding to basic existential crises.

The Influence of Organization Structure

Suggesting that organization structural characteristics—such as degree of hierarchy and identity—have emotional outcomes begs the question of the mechanism by which these structures produce emotions (Link 1 in Figure 1). The classical rational approach to organizations implies particular structural outcomes, including division of labor (by hierarchy as well as function), specified spans of control and hierarchical means-end goal structures, meaning that the ends are defined broadly at the top of a hierarchy, and the means for achieving them are specified below (Simon 1976). In line with a situationist approach I argue that these structural factors have an impact on emotion, but in a complex way: they do not directly cause or control emotional response, but they frame, or limit response. Structural factors are the background for situations that do arouse emotional response (Gordon 1990; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988; Schott 1979, p. 1321). In particular, "Organizations invest situations with emotional meaning and specify roles which constrain the possible reactions of their occupants" (Parkinson 1991, p. 433).

Such a contention is consistent with approaches emphasizing that organizations are "strong" situations, in the sense that they limit the amount of individual difference variability allowed in behavior. As Monson, Hesley, and Chernick (1982) argue, behaviors allowed at a job interview or in the office are more constrained than those in the park, or one's bedroom. Forces constraining behavior—as well as underlying attitudes and emotion—in organizations include structural factors, such as work unit structure (Berger and Cummings 1979), job design (Hackman and Oldham 1980), and the overall structures of power and opportunity (Kanter 1977, p. 245). Organizations are strong situations in the sense that both vertical hierarchical status and horizontal interdependence concerns are salient (Collins 1975; Kemper 1990). They are also strong in the sense that they are the site of ongoing interpersonal relationships, which both sociologists (e.g., Kemper 1981) and psychologists (e.g., Lazarus,

Kanner, and Folkman 1980) contend are the primary instigators of emotional response. This suggests that organization structures both produce strong emotions as well as constrict the individual variability in emotions expressed.

Proposition 3. Achieving bounded rationality in organizations implies control over structural variables. These variables provide the framework for situations which lead to, and constrict, emotional response.

The literature on emotional responses to hierarchy provide an example of this contention. Organizational studies of hierarchical effects have shown increased levels of motivation, involvement, and affective satisfaction in members at higher positions in the hierarchy and decreased levels of satisfaction in lower positions (Argyris 1957; Tannenbaum et al. 1974). Such findings are consistent with Collins's (1975) structural approach. Drawing on Weber's concepts of bureaucracy and Durkheim's emphasis on emotions in ritual, Collins proposed that the primary stratification system is crystallized into those who give orders and those who are required to take them. This system is salient in organizations, best understood as "ritual reality constructions" where social occasions—from performance appraisals to retirement dinners—arouse strong emotions. Specifically (Collins 1990, p. 36),

Order-givers and order-takers share the dominance/anger/fear/passivity complex, but in very different proportions. They also share an orientation toward dominant symbols....Order-givers identify themselves with the sacred objects of their organization...order-takers, on the other hand, have an ambivalent attitude toward the dominant symbols.

In agreement with Kemper, Collins views these emotional reactions as the direct effects of social stratification, not mediated by cultural norms instructing bosses and subordinates how to behave.

Thus, this model suggests that the existential crisis of hierarchy, codified in organizations as "steep" (having many levels) or "flat" (having few levels) authority structures, gives rise to relationships of power (agency) which predictably arouse emotions such as fear and anger (Figure 1, Link 1) (Collins 1990). Structural sources of identity, codified in organizations as work teams, and structures ranging from individual, autonomous emphases to participative collective ones, give rise to emotions such as liking, acceptance, and alternatively, disgust and disliking. Essential to these links is the process of arousal: the *fact* of hierarchy does not directly imply anger and fear, rather it is the perception of this hierarchy as meaningful by participants that gives rise to particular emotions (Frijda 1986).

The Influence of Culture

Social constructionists, however, are quick to point out that we can neither consider felt nor expressed emotions without taking into account mediation by cultural norms. The point is perhaps most neatly summarized by Geertz (1973, p. 81) as: "Not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts." Though Kemper (1981) would argue for the salience of Link 4 in the model, that expressed emotions are largely those felt, theorists such as Hochschild argue that the link is always mediated by norms. She (1979, 1983) proposes a two-step process in the social experience of emotion, one in which social factors (such as Kemper's power and status accord) arouse primary, nonreflective but conscious emotions which are then "managed" by secondary acts (Hochschild 1979, p. 552). Regardless of whether emotions are aroused by physiological arousal, cognitive appraisal, or other means, this approach suggests that an essential ingredient in our experience of emotion is our capacity to regulate it, to inhibit—or augment—emotional responses to suit the situation.

Thus, I argue that though felt emotion may "leak through" (Ekman 1985) emotional displays, the mediation of emotional response by culture norms or display rules (whether arising from within the organization or without) must be considered (Links 2 and 3 in Figure 1). At the individual level, individuals control their own emotional responses; within the organization contrived cultures shape and control individual emotional responses (Van Maanen and Kunda 1989), in boundary-spanning roles organizations develop and maintain emotion display norms as a means of controlling the organizational "face" put forward to interested publics, in the interest of meeting customer service goals (Sutton 1991). Whether cultural norms will mediate the link between felt and expressed emotions is the result of the strength of the norms (that is, the interest of the organization in fostering consistent emotional expressions); the strength and type of the individual's felt emotion (Is it anger? Sadness? Fear?); individual differences (such as gender, dispositional affect, or impression management ability), and the structure of the situation. As I have argued, it is the structure of the situation, such as the interaction of employees and customers (e.g., in convenience stores where store pace leads to expression of felt emotions), and the interchange between superiors and subordinates, that has not been emphasized in previous cultural norms models.

Proposition 4. Felt emotions may be expressed as they are felt, or moderated by culture to produce expressed emotions, depending on (a) the strength of the display rule, (b) the strength and type of the felt emotion, (c) individual differences in capacity and motivation to feel and express emotion, and (d) the structure of the situation. Organization cultural norms imply emotion control.

The model is thus explicitly interactionist in that it argues that structures and cultures limit, but do not completely erase, individual variability. There are at least two stages in which individual differences may intervene, in the link between structure and felt response (Link 5 in Figure 1) and between felt and expressed emotions (Link 6). In terms of the first link, Frijda (1986, p. 333) points out that emotional response arises from both an encounter with an event "and a concern to which that event is relevant and to which it owes its emotional impact." These concerns are relatively stable dispositions that point to events which will be considered meaningful. The fact that not all events elicit emotion, and that events that arouse strong emotions in one individual leave another unaffected, implies dispositional differences. In terms of the second link between felt and expressed emotions, I have noted that individuals differ in their ability to successfully control their emotional expression, depending, for example, on impression management ability.

Constricted Emotions in Organizations: An Illustration

Propositions 3 and 4 suggest that organizations are strong situations which limit individual variability in emotional response due to both structural (e.g., the effect of hierarchical status differences in limiting expressions of particular emotions) and cultural-normative (e.g., display rules limiting the expression of particular emotions) factors. An exploratory study of emotion episodes individuals experienced in a variety of organizations will serve to illustrate this point. The study explores the emotions Plutchik identified as arising from particular structural cues: anger and fear from hierarchy, joy and sadness from temporality, acceptance and disgust from identity, and anticipation and surprise from territoriality. Using these emotions as prompts, I asked respondents, "When did you feel this strong emotion?" "What did you do about it?" Three implications of the model are explored: (1) that there will be a discrepancy between emotions felt and those expressed, suggesting that participants manage their emotions; (2) that participants manage their emotions differently depending on which emotion it is; that is, certain emotions (e.g., anger) will be more likely to be expressed in organizations than others (e.g., sadness or fear), suggesting cultural norms for emotional expression; and (3) that emotion management is shaped by status and gender differences.

This study extends previous research by first, focusing on emotions primarily *internal* to an organization, rather than on those experienced and expressed in boundary-spanning or customer service roles; second, by analyzing a range of specific emotions, both positive and negative, rather than diffuse positive (i.e., job satisfaction studies) or particular negative (i.e., anger, jealousy, resentment) emotions, which have characterized previous studies; and third, by providing a theoretical rationale for integrating structural sources of particular emotions rather than focusing on emotion management (e.g.,

Hochschild 1983) or individual differences (e.g., Staw, Bell, and Clausen 1986) to the exclusion of structural considerations.

Respondents were 159 MBA students enrolled in a full-time program at a major public university. A majority (72%) of the sample was male, with a mean age of 28. Eighty percent had been managers or supervisors in a past work situation, with a median four subordinates. Respondents were presented with a survey requesting them to recall an emotional event in their work experience, describe it in detail, then answer a series of seven-point Likert scales, followed by demographic questions (see Appendix A). The events to be described were prompted by one of the eight basic emotions proposed by Plutchik (1980): anger, fear, joy, sadness, acceptance/liking, disgust, anticipation/eagerness, or surprise. Survey methodology was used because it allowed for a large number of participants from a variety of organizations. Though these data are not as rich as would be possible through more in-depth techniques such as one-on-one interviewing, there is compelling evidence that respondents may actually be more likely to reveal sensitive information on anonymous surveys (Scherer, Wallbott, and Summerfield 1986; Waldron and Krone 1991).

Analysis

There were a total of 143 useable accounts of emotion episodes, after eliminating those in which accounts were not given, or so little information was given that analysis was impossible. Drawing on research which suggests that feeling and expression of emotions may approximate sequences of events or scripts (e.g., Fischer 1991; Russell 1991), I content analyzed the emotion episodes in terms of how respondents perceived the antecedents, or causes of their emotion, their identification of a particular person as a causal agent, whether and how they expressed the emotion, and what the reaction from others was. For each of these four elements I created codes to capture their content, initially coding a subsample (50%) of the accounts, and then using the codes generated to categorize the remaining accounts (see Gibson 1995 for specific coding examples). Following my coding, two researchers subsequently coded the sample independently. Overall interrater reliabilities between myself and the two coders was .77 and .70, correcting for the number of categories and chance agreements using the pi procedure suggested by Scott (1955). These reliabilities compare favorably with other studies of emotion scripts (e.g., Scherer, Wallbott, and Summerfield 1986, p. 43; Fischer 1991, p. 130).

Findings

Table 1 provides data on the antecedents and expressions of eight emotions as cited by respondents. These data suggest that there was substantial cohesion to the types of situations that provoked strong emotions, and to a lesser degree,

patterns in their tendency to be expressed. For most emotions, three categories accounted for half of the antecedent events; this was especially true for positive emotions, where 72 to 100 percent were explained by three categories, such as "camaraderie in groups" for acceptance/liking, and "job or project completed" for joy. Not surprisingly, the antecedents of particular emotions were more complex than direct linkages between structural cues and felt emotions. In general, strong negative emotions (anger, fear, sadness, and disgust) revolved around relationships with superiors, suggesting the influence of hierarchy and specifically status differences in framing these situations. There were subtle differences between emotions as well, however. For example, anger tended to arise from perceptions of injustice to oneself (cf. de Rivera 1977; Russell 1991), particularly by superiors or generalized to the organization as a whole, whereas disgust tended to revolve around others' lack of effectiveness; others were seen as involved in flagrant politics, criticizing the respondent or others—particularly out of ignorance—and characterized by technical or managerial incompetence. Such antecedents seemed to reflect identity concerns of defining who is part of one's in-group, and separating from those who are outside, as opposed to feeling anger from a personal affront. Fear episodes revolved around the themes of threat and loss of control, but often the source seemed to be one's own actions (e.g., fear of failure in a task), rather than specific fear of superiors, adding complexity to the notion of hierarchy prompting fear. Sadness often resulted from "failure of another person or project," consistent with the temporality dimension. Surprise, reflecting the ambiguity in its valence researchers have noted (e.g., Plutchik 1980), seemed to emerge from various negatively charged events, which could be construed as territoriality concerns (e.g., prior understanding of work changed), but were less clearly linked than other emotions.

Positive emotions were characterized by more diversity in terms of agents. Joy was highly individually oriented, directed at success by oneself at a task or a project and exhibited a temporal dimension in that the beginnings and endings of tasks could signal joy. The identity dimension was clear in feelings of acceptance/liking, which arose universally from team and peer interaction. Anticipation exhibited more diffuse sources, and had elements of temporal (beginning projects, anticipating presentations) as well as identity (joining a new team) concerns.

The contention that individuals manage their expression of felt emotions in organizations is suggested by the free response data in Table 1, as well as the Likert scale data in Figure 2. Table 1 shows the extent to which emotional expression was withheld in these episodes; on average 62 percent of negative emotions and 56 percent of positive ones¹ were not expressed to the agents who prompted them. Table 1 suggests further that there are norms pertaining to particular emotions. Specifically, of the negative emotions, respondents were most likely to express their anger (53% of episodes expressed to agents), and

Table 1. Composite Emotion Episodes

Elements	Emotions Described by Respondents			
	Anger n = 19	Fear n = 15	Sadness n = 23	Disgust n = 23
Antecedents	Criticism of respondent (16%)* Suggestions ignored by Agent (16%) Company initiates layoffs (16%) 48% explained by top 3 categories Superiors (39%) Company (22%)	Failure by Self (27%) Threats external to the organization (13%) Lack of corporate support for respondent (13%) 53% explained by top 3 categories Superiors (43%) Self (21%) External agents (13%)	Prior understanding about work denied or changed (17%) Failure of another person or project (13%) Company initiates layoffs (13%) 44% explained by top 3 categories Superiors (71%)	Flagrant politics (13%) Criticism of respondent (13%) Technical or managerial incompetence by others (13%) 39% explained by top 3 categories Superiors (71%)
Agents	Expressed to agent (53%) Did not express (47%)	Expressed to agent (20%) Did not express (80%)	Expressed to agent (26%) Did not express (74%)	Expressed to agent (48%) Did not express (52%)
Expression/Behavior				

Emotions Described by Respondents

Elements	Surprise n = 18	Joy n = 16	Acceptance/ Liking n = 15	Anticipation/ Eagerness n = 14
Antecedents	Criticism of respondent (28%) Prior understanding about work denied or changed (17%) Company initiates layoffs (17%) 62% explained by top 3 categories	Job or Project completed (47%) Respondent receives recognition or promotion (24%) Job or Project beginning (12%) 82% explained by top 3 categories	Camaraderie in Groups (53%) Positive relationship with a particular other (40%) Respondent receives recognition or promotion (7%) 100% explained by top 3 categories	Job or project beginning (29%) Camaraderie in groups (29%) Approaching or making presentations to others (14%) 72% explained by top 3 categories
Agents	Superiors (56%) Co-workers (17%)	Work itself (38%) Superiors (25%)	Team/peers (67%)	Superiors (36%) Peers (28%)
Expression/ Behavior	Expressed to agent (39%) Did not express (61%)	Expressed to agent (19%) Did not express (81%)	Expressed to agent (60%) Did not express (40%)	Expressed to agent (57%) Did not express (43%)

Note: *Indicates percent of respondents who identified this antecedent as a cause of their anger episode.

Source: Adapted from Gibson (1995).

least likely to express their fear (20% expressed to agents). Of the positive emotions, acceptance was most likely to be expressed (60% of episodes) while joy was least likely (19%). Qualitative comments confirmed that respondents attempted to manage their display of emotion, but that particular emotions were more or less susceptible to management. For example, there was a sense that it was proper to express anger in the light of a personal injustice. One respondent felt betrayed and angry when a promised raise did not materialize; further she felt compelled to tell her supervisor: "I felt very angry and let it be known." Another, noting that his personal credibility was at stake, expressed his anger in a "heated conversation" which later led to a resolution of the problem. On the other hand, expressions of fear were highly constrained in these workplaces. For instance, one respondent spoke of strong fear and anxiety surrounding a project that had been delivered to a client, compounded by a lack of support from his boss. Little of this emotion could be expressed, however: "I could not express it to the clients because it would have ruined our business. There was no one else around to express it to (except my wife and friends, of course)." Another respondent, fearful of approaching a superior about a previously promised promotion, indicated his behavior as well as suggested the reason why: "Kept [my emotion] to myself. Discussed with friends and family but not to anyone at work. Did not express emotions at work. Felt that expressing emotion was a sign of weakness."




Figure 2. Strength and Frequency of Felt Emotions versus Expression

The limitation of emotional expression was true for positive emotions as well, particularly joy. Fully 81 percent of joy episodes were not expressed to the agent who caused them, and this pattern was especially pronounced in interactions with superiors; though four (of 16) of the episodes involved joy caused by a superior, respondents reported no instances in which they expressed the emotion to that agent. When one respondent completed an important project she felt "free, elated, light...like a tremendous burden had been lifted," yet those at work were unaware of her joy: "I think I felt it 'unprofessional' to 'show' my joy," she reported. Another, who experienced "an amazing feeling of accomplishment and satisfaction" in response to bringing in a large client, "pretended to be low key" to others; she "didn't want to be too obvious to [her] co-workers." On the other hand, expressions of acceptance and liking, perceived as a less self-focused emotion, were quite likely to be expressed, by "confiding" in others, being "friendly, talkative, and thankful," and by "verbal acknowledgment of a good job, body language" including "smiles, pat on shoulder—[and a] willingness to work with these people in the future."

The theme, overall, was maintaining emotional control in the workplace. Even anger, the most acceptable of the negative emotions, had to be managed, and respondents expressed regret when their expressions were beyond their active control. As one woman respondent noted, "When I lost control and started yelling at my boss, he became very defensive and then got angry. It was a mistake to lose control—it worked against me." A male respondent noted, "I was surprised and angry and it required a great deal of effort to control my emotions. After telling him that I felt his behavior was extremely unprofessional, I excused myself from the situation."

Analysis of the Likert-scaled questions confirmed that respondents' perceived strength of their emotion exceeded their tendency to display it. Figure 2 graphs the means for each emotion, showing that in all cases save acceptance, emotions were more strongly felt than they were expressed. Paired comparison *t*-tests revealed that the discrepancy between strength of feeling and openness of expression was significant for sadness ($p < .001$), fear ($p < .01$), anger ($p < .05$), and anticipation ($p < .05$). These findings are consistent with the results (derived from the open-ended episode descriptions) in Table 1, with the exception of joy. Though the categorical analysis suggests that joy was not openly expressed, especially to agents, the responses to scaled questions show a nonsignificant discrepancy between strength of feeling and subsequent expression.

The findings related to expression of particular emotions is also supported by data in Figure 2. First, the graph shows that emotions were universally strongly felt. One-way ANOVAs indicate that this response did not differ across emotions ($F [7,139] = 0.89$, *p*-value n.s.—not surprising, given the prompting of the questionnaire to recall a strong emotion at work); nor did they differ in the frequency of emotions felt ($F [7,138] = 0.70$, *p*-value n.s.). The ANOVA

across emotions for "How openly expressed?" however, is significant ($F[7,139] = 2.26, p < .05$), indicating that specific emotions showed differences in expression. In particular, post hoc contrasts showed that negative emotions differed significantly from particular positive ones (such as acceptance vs. anger, sadness, or fear), but more importantly, negative emotions also differed from each other: specifically sadness and disgust (contrast 1 df, $p < .05$; as well as sadness and surprise) differed in the degree that they were openly expressed. The positive emotions of acceptance and anticipation also contrasted significantly ($p < .05$).

Tables 2 and 3 provide overall results for the effects of status and gender on emotional expression. Though limited sample sizes make these findings speculative, the effects of status illustrate further the effects of hierarchical structure on emotional expression. Table 2 suggests that respondents were overall unlikely to express either positive or negative emotions to their superiors, and only somewhat more likely to express positive emotions to their peers or subordinates. In terms of specific emotions, anger was more likely to be expressed to superiors than to peers (eight of 11 cases involving superiors, two of five cases involving peers/subordinates); while disgust was less likely to be displayed to higher status agents (10 of 15 cases not displayed to superiors, one of five not displayed to peers/subordinates). Fear, in all cases (seven) aroused by superiors, was not expressed to them. In terms of positive emotions, joy was rarely expressed to either status group, though acceptance/liking and anticipation were both more likely to be expressed to peers than superiors.

There were mixed results regarding gender differences in the emotion episodes. Overall, men as a group expressed either positive or negative emotions in 34 percent of their episodes, while women expressed them 53 percent of the time. While this may suggest that women respondents were more emotionally expressive, it could also reflect women respondents' higher likelihood to discuss their emotional expression on a self-report survey (Shields 1987), and thus must be treated with caution. Overall, women were somewhat more likely to express

Table 2. Percent Who Expressed Emotion to Superiors Versus Others by Emotion Valence

Emotion Valence	Agent Status				Total	Number of Episodes
	Superiors		Peers/Subordinates			
	Expressed to Agent %	Not Expressed to Agent %	Expressed to Agent %	Not Expressed to Agent %		
Negative	31	47	11	11	100	62
Positive	12	35	35	18	100	34

Table 3. Percent of Male Versus Female Respondents Who Expressed Emotion to Agents by Emotion Valence

Emotion Valence	Respondent Gender				Total	Number of Episodes
	Men		Women			
	Expressed to Agent %	Not Expressed to Agent %	Expressed to Agent %	Not Expressed to Agent %		
Negative	23	54	14	9	100	74
Positive	27	39	16	18	100	44

negative emotions to their agents than were men (in 10 of 17 episodes women expressed negative emotions; in 40 of 57 episodes, men did not express them). In terms of specific emotions, differences were found for anger (three out of four women expressed it, while eight out of 15 [53%] men did not); sadness (three out of five women expressed sadness, 14 of 16 [88%] of men did not), and fear (10 of 10 men did not express fear, while two women split evenly on this decision). The pattern of specific positive emotions was similar between the two groups, although women were somewhat less likely to express anticipation than men.

Evidence that women are more likely to express strong emotions should not be construed as evidence that women control their felt emotions to a lesser degree than men. Rather, there is some support for the notion that women were *less* open about the strength of their emotions. Results from the Likert-scaled questions showed that women reported significantly higher strength of emotional feeling than men (Women, $M = 5.97$; Men, $M = 5.51$; difference significant, $t = 2.12$, $df = 95$, $p < .05$) and this was particularly true for anger (Women, $M = 6.75$; Men, $M = 5.14$; difference significant, $p < .01$). Yet women were not significantly different than men in terms of their perceived openness of emotional expression (Women, $M = 4.76$; men, $M = 4.55$; difference n.s.), or their frequency of feeling strong emotions (Women, $M = 3.63$; Men, $M = 3.37$; difference n.s.). This suggests that though their feelings were stronger, women perceived themselves as being only about as open with them as were men.

In summary, this exploratory study emphasizes the discrepancy between felt and expressed emotions in organizations, and provides both qualitative and quantitative data supporting the degree of discrepancy for particular emotions. It further suggests that emotions emerged from situations exhibiting underlying structures, particularly, hierarchy, identity, and temporality. The study, of course, cannot make the claim that organizational context explains all of the limiting process; societal norms surrounding emotions such as anger and fear are well documented in a variety of settings (Cancian and Gordon 1988; Stearns and Stearns 1986). Rather, it suggests that in order to understand

organizational emotions, structure must be taken into account, as well as norms surrounding particular, as opposed to generalized, emotions.

The Narrow Band of Emotions

The findings support what observers such as Goffman (1959) argues about life in general and Zaleznik (1989) argues about organizations in particular: that a manager's work is more or less continuously on stage. Though a broad band of strong emotions are felt relatively frequently at work, their expression is limited to a narrow band of acceptable emotion. Specifically, the findings suggest that though there are professional caveats against it (e.g., Sutton 1991; Zaleznik 1989) anger is displayed in the workplace, especially to superiors, who are their primary source. While emotions such as fear and sadness are hidden (particularly by men), emotions signaling approach or aggressive behavior, such as anger and disgust are acceptable to express, given justifying circumstances. This finding is indicative of two themes increasingly identified with emotional expression in organizations: first, that organizations reflect a masculine context which foregrounds certain emotions at the expense of others, and second, that emotion control is viewed as a strength. Parkin (1993, p. 169) argues that emotion control in organizations reflects a "male sexual narrative" in which men dominate through leadership, status, hierarchy, authority, management, power, and language. The narrative also includes the theme that emotion in general is associated with femaleness, while anger in particular is associated with maleness (Shields 1987); thus organizations, constructed primarily by men, exhibit a masculine emphasis on anger and control. And significantly, anger and control are further linked to rationality; whereas in general, emotionality is associated with irrationality, anger and control of emotions are considered "rational." As I have argued earlier, this value system promotes the creation of structures that further the masculine ethos of separation of emotion and reason.

It is intriguing to examine as well what emotions get left out of this idealized rational landscape. I have noted that fear and sadness, potentially signs of vulnerability, are generally absent. On the positive emotion side, those emotions signaling cooperation, teamwork, and identity, such as acceptance and liking, are more likely to be displayed than those signaling individual achievement, such as joy. These findings suggest that expressions of acceptance and liking may be "low-cost," while expressing joy may be perceived by participants as making one vulnerable. Overall, emotional expression is seen by participants as a form of information, valuable information about vulnerabilities, values, and motivations which need to be protected, or at least managed appropriately lest ambiguous or damaging messages leak out (see DePaulo 1992).

IMPLICATIONS

I have made three central arguments. First, that organizations are an important context for studying emotions, primarily because organizations have been consciously contrived to achieve (bounded) rationality and this rationality is captured in the structures that are created. Second, the effect of these structures is to limit (though not eliminate) behavior considered "irrational," a label which is applied to emotional expression. Third, organization culture display rules extend and amplify the limiting process, with both managers and researchers alike emphasizing their instrumental capacity for achieving this (e.g., Deal and Kennedy 1982; Sutton 1991). The model presented here has specific implications for managers; I outline the implications of the narrow band of emotions first, followed by implications of the structural cues of hierarchy, identity, temporality, and territoriality.

The fact that felt emotions may be shaped by both structural cues and display rules suggests that managers must be aware of the potential loss of information produced by controlled emotions. As the study of emotion episodes suggested, events arousing strong felt emotions constituted meaningful incidents for individuals. Episodes of anger prompted respondents to judge the fairness of their managers; episodes of fear caused them to reassess themselves and their potential for failure; episodes of acceptance represented emotional highs in which respondents felt bonded to team members, potentially cementing their relationship with the organization. Emotional events, then, are considered pivotal to those experiencing them, signaling potential changes in the individual-organizational relationship, yet if norms exist limiting emotional expression, the significance of these events may be lost on managers—they will observe the mask of the emotion norm, but not the real feeling beneath.

There are three senses in which managerial action may be shaped by the narrow band of expressed emotions. First, managers who are aware of the sources and potential control of particular emotions may be better able to assess situations when participants are signaling a need for change. Understanding that subordinates are unlikely to express emotions of fear, for example, suggests that managers provide an environment in which fear and anxiety can be expressed and interpreted for its sources and possible solutions. This awareness can be extended, as well, to motivating employees—to the degree that managers can understand the underlying emotional reaction their colleagues and subordinates have to organization work, they will be in a better position to provide task structures which increase individual effectiveness. Second, much research points to the salience of affect and intuition on the decision-making process (e.g., Mumby and Putnam 1992; Simon 1989); not only is the evaluation of alternatives suggested by emotional response essential to rational choice, but the process of decision making itself has been shown to be influenced by emotion (see e.g., Isen and Baron 1991). Yet if affective inputs are limited to approach

emotions, such as anger and acceptance, while avoidance emotions, such as fear and sadness are suppressed, organizational decision making may be likewise limited. Rational decision making, which requires consideration of a wide range of alternatives (Simon 1976), could be limited by affective narrowness. This suggests that managers appreciate the likely emotional inputs and outcomes to important decisions; for example, in decisions to lay off workers, the emotional reaction of both the victims and survivors must explicitly be made part of the implementation process (Brockner 1988).

Finally, the prevalence of emotion control encourages managers to recognize the power of the norms they create for emotional expression. In organizations where devising cultural values has become a strategic task of top management (Peters and Waterman 1982), emotional expressions by individuals have more than personal meaning: they hold strategic importance to the company. At the same time, if display rules suppress expressions of anger, leaders should recognize that they also lose potential signals of perceived injustice. Cultures that suppress fear may lose signals of potential risk; cultures that suppress expressions of acceptance and liking may lose the potential for team building and cooperation. Rather, to the extent that leaders can manage the values and norms of their organizations, they need to create cultures which promote organizational goals while allowing emotional expression which might contribute to those goals. The mere existence of rational structures does not imply that emotions are absent; this is an outcome of organizations which have historically developed values linking rationality to a complex of masculinity, power, and hierarchy.

Emotional Implications of Structural Cues

Viewing organizations as emotional rather than cognitive entities implies that our research examine more fully how organizational structures influence participants' emotional lives. The following section provides avenues of future research inquiry, organized by the structural cues which I propose underlie emotional responses.

Hierarchy

The tendency for hierarchy, and more generally, status differences, to promote a complex of anger and fear in superiors and subordinates is well documented (Collins 1990; Stearns and Stearns 1986). An implication of the model presented here (and the argument of such theorists as Argyris 1957) is that *more* hierarchy might lead to *more* of these emotions; that is that organizations characterized by steeper hierarchies and more authoritarian control structures would predictably arouse greater degrees of anger in superiors and greater degrees of fear in subordinates. If this is the case, the

heralded change in organizations from the authoritarian, pyramidal structures of the past to the team-oriented, networked structures of the future should indicate a change in the emotional landscape. The range of structural cues presented here, however, suggests that the outcomes are more complex than this. One implication of reduced overt hierarchical structures—in the sense of narrow spans of control and multiple job grades—is that emotions associated with identity (acceptance and disgust) and territoriality (anticipation, surprise) may take on new salience (see below). A second implication is that though overt hierarchy may change, status differences remain, with predictable emotional outcomes. For example, women and minorities continue to make up a disproportionate share of lower-status positions in organizations (Eagly 1987). Lower-status individuals will be more likely to feel the effects of anger from the dominant group, and their own fear of surviving in contexts in which higher-status positions are occupied by people who don't look like them. Thus, though the effects of organizational hierarchy may be reduced, emotions driven by status differences will remain, in the future to be based on demographic and similarity differences. The tendency to feel anger and fear is exacerbated by another hierarchical tendency, for those in higher status positions to engage in freer expression of emotion than those in lower-status positions (Van Maanen and Kunda 1989). Thus, those in lower-status positions are simultaneously more likely to feel strong emotions, and less likely to be able to express them; there is an interaction here between structural effects which cause emotion, and norms which control who in the organization is allowed to express them. Research should examine this interaction and its potential effects on both lower- and higher-status individuals in organizations.

Identity

Identity concerns are critical in organizations in which overt hierarchy may be on the wane, but in which concern for the survival of one's identity groups becomes the primary motivator. The movement toward team-based structures suggests that *informal* ties may take on more importance than the formal dictates of an explicit hierarchy; that is, whereas in a hierarchy there are explicit rules for promotion (whether they are followed completely or not), now one's success in the organization may be based more on acceptance by informal groups. Again, those who do not fit the characteristics of the dominant in-group may face difficulties in achieving success, though the reason will be buried in the new emphasis on informal interaction rather than overt discrimination. This model predicts that emotional responses, though somewhat different than in the overt emphasis on status differences, will nonetheless be strong, surrounding emotions of love and acceptance on the positive side, disgust and repulsion on the negative. A further structural effect is the control of teams on emotions. Work in cohesive teams has simultaneously been recognized as a structure promoting increased

productivity and motivation, as well as heightened social control. Working in a hierarchical structure, where status is legitimated in the role of a manager directing subordinates, their negative emotions can be felt and often directed toward this clear authoritarian figure. Team structures, on the other hand, may prevent such expression. As Barker (1993) quotes a member of a self-managing team in a high-tech firm:

I don't have to sit there and look for the boss to be around; and if the boss is not around, I can sit there and talk to my neighbor or do what I want. Now, the whole team is around me and the whole team is observing what I'm doing.

The very emphasis on cohesion and group effort implies strong norms against expression of emotions that may disrupt consistent and motivated effort. Team players may feel constricted by display rules which emphasize positive emotions in the expression of team "spirit," and a strict prohibition of negative emotions which indicate divergence of feeling from the team.

Overall, changes in the tendency of organizations to structure hierarchically will lead to different *kinds* of emotional response, rather than a necessary lessening of negative response, as some promoting teams have suggested. Research should examine the ways in which the trend toward identity structures shape the overall pattern and outcomes of emotions.

Territoriality

A related structural trend is for organizations to become more decentralized, pushing decision making outward, closer to the customer. There are two important implications of this. First, as outlined in the previous review, the new emphasis on boundary-spanning roles will mean increased attention to emotion management. What has been less studied is the degree to which an emphasis on responding to customers *internal* to the organization may increase the levels of emotion management throughout the organization. For example, the focus of reengineering on treating all receivers of organizational processes as "clients" is a signal of the trend (Hammer and Champy 1993). Whether increased emotion management has negative individual effects, as noted, has not been confirmed, but certainly the trends suggest that more individuals will be engaged in controlling the direction of their emotions. Since studies suggest that the negative impact of dissonance with felt emotions may be mediated by identification with the role (e.g., Ashforth and Humphrey 1993), further study should examine the degree to which internal, as well as external relationships generate sufficient identification to overcome the gap between feeling and emotional expression. A second implication of territoriality, related to the increase of interactions across the boundary between organization and customer, is that participants may be less and less connected interpersonally

to their organizations. Consulting firms and sales positions stressing constant interaction with customers simultaneously remove ties to the organization itself, both relationally and physically: participants now telecommute from home or auto, and when "visiting" their organization, are offered a generic office, much as hotels provide rented rooms. These structures simultaneously imply increased emotion management at the juncture between participant and customer, and less opportunity for emotional connection (identity emotions such as acceptance and liking) with other participants. Again, to the extent that participants identify with the service provider role, this disconnect may cause no deleterious effects. Future research should study, however, the potential for emotional alienation in such positions.

Temporality

Finally, the temporality dimension suggests specific emotional outcomes surrounding individuals' responses to organizational control over time. The theme of focusing on internal organizational interactions versus external ones is critical here as well; participants can no longer count on an extended period of time within a single organization, but rather, face careers that are likely to be "protean," that is, more self- than organization-directed job patterns characterized by shorter tenures in multiple organizations, with the concomitant requirement of continuous learning and fundamental identity changes (Hall 1996). These new time structures do not necessarily suggest obvious emotional outcomes—some participants may respond to the new careers with a welcome sense of joy at the challenge and an appreciation of increased opportunities; others may experience the sadness and anxiety of a world in which one has to constantly be preparing for the next job—what they do suggest is that the emotional response to career and organization changes will be more frequent. Future study should examine the conditions under which increasingly rapid career changes foster positive or negative emotional outcomes. A second implication of temporality is that organizations are increasingly characterized by an inner core of full time, full-benefited employees, surrounded by a larger donut of temporary workers, contract players who come and go as production necessitates (Handy 1994). The issue of how emotional responses might differ between these two groups is intriguing. Full timers, while confronted with emotions linked to hierarchy, identity, and territoriality, may feel the confidence and joy of being in the privileged inner circle. Temporary workers will potentially feel a sadness at their tenuous link to the organization, exacerbated by identity concerns of never being quite "of the group."

CONCLUSION

That emotions are produced by design and controlled according to accepted organizational norms is paradoxical: control is both necessary and potentially detrimental, just as "venting" of strong emotion is simultaneously considered uncivilized and beneficial for the individual (King and Emmons 1990). By controlling the expression of emotion, organizations enhance interpersonal interaction, because expectations are well-known; the vagaries of individual expression are buffered by institutionalized patterns of interaction. At the same time, controlling expression results in a potential loss of evaluative information, as well as individuals responding more to the requirements of their culture than their intrapsychic needs for expression.

Emotions are a fact of organizational life. We feel, we know we feel, we know others feel, yet little is known about how these feelings shape and are shaped by organizations. We may slap on our bland, agreeable, public smiles at work, and in most cases this is just what is necessary and sufficient to lubricate the machinery of our social relationships. Most of the time we want nor need little else. At the same time, it is essential to ask why we need a public face, why we put it on so much of the time, and why it's so different from most of what goes on inside. In our struggle to show the face of reason, we must ask about the inevitable emotional undercurrent. We must understand as much about emotion as we do about reason.

APPENDIX A

Emotional Episodes Questionnaire

EMOTIONS AT WORK

Think about a time you experienced a strong emotion at work. Though we might not talk about it much, we experience a variety of emotions at work, and these experiences have clear impacts—on our decision making, on our productivity, on our view of others, and on our view of the work itself. This study is concerned with your experience of specific emotions at work, what caused the emotion, whether you expressed it, and what happened afterwards.

1. Think of a time when you felt *angry* [fearful, joyful, acceptance or liking, etc.] in response to a situation at work. Outline the situation that brought about this feeling, and describe in as much detail as you can how you felt. What circumstances or events caused this feeling? What people were involved? What was your relationship with them?

2. How frequently do you feel this emotion at work?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not at all

Quite

Frequently

Frequently

3. How strongly, overall, did you feel the emotion?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not at all

Very

Strongly

Strongly

4. How did you express your emotion to others? (Did other people know that you were experiencing anger?)

5. If you did express your emotion, what happened as a result?

6. If you did not express it, what caused you to hold back?

7. Overall, how openly would you say you expressed your anger to others?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Not at all

Quite

Openly

Openly

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NOTE

1. For purposes of this analysis, "negative emotions" are responses for anger, fear, sadness, and disgust. "Positive emotions" are joy, acceptance/liking, and anticipation. Surprise is omitted from these groupings because there was some ambiguity as to its valence (see Plutchik 1980). Most respondents considered surprise to be negative, but in the interest of clarifying the difference between positive versus negative, I omit it from analyses separating the two.

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